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PUBLICLY FINANCED JUDICIAL
ELECTIONS: AN OVERVIEW
Charles GardnerGeyh*
I. INTRODUCTION

To fund increasingly expensive judicial races, candidates are
soliciting more contributions from lawyers, would-be litigants, and
special interest groups, which creates the perception that judges are
beholden to those contributors. One means to eliminate that perception would be to finance judicial elections with public funds and
thereby obviate the need for private contributions altogether. Indeed
the case for public financing is arguably more compelling for judicial
elections than political branch races because unlike the latter, where
constituent influence over political branch decision making is appropriate and desirable, the perception of external influence overjudicial decision making is especially problematic.
Public financing programs have been introduced in over twenty
states. Ambitious public funding legislation recently enacted in Arizona, Massachusetts, Maine, and Vermont suggests that interest in
public financing programs is increasing.! However, only Wisconsin
has made a serious effort to fund judicial races. The most serious
hurdles to publicly funding judicial elections include:
* ensuring that the program is adequately funded;

• Professor of Law, Indiana University at Bloomington. The views expressed herein are mine alone and do not necessarily reflect those of the ABA
Commission on Public Financing of Judicial Campaigns, on which I serve as
reporter, the opinions of the National Center for State Courts, the Joyce Foundation, or the Open Society Institute. I would like to thank Philip Adam Davis
for his excellent research assistance, and Luke Bierman, Eileen Gallagher,
David Rottman, and Roy Schotland for their comments on earlier drafts.
1. See Mary M. Janicki, Public Financing Update, OLR RESEARCH REP.
(Nov. 4, 1999), at http://www.cga.state.ct.uslps99/rptlolr/htm/99-r-I 102.htm

1467

1468

LOYOLA OFLOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 34:1467

" making certain that only serious candidates qualify for public
funds;
" offsetting the impact of excessive independent expenditures on
behalf of candidates whose publicly funded opponents have
agreed to limit their spending; and
" balancing the benefits to judicial independence of diminishing
the impact of private money in judicial elections with the costs
of increased competition in judicial races.
In an effort to facilitate discussion of public financing as one
possible means to ameliorate some of the recent problems that have
arisen in judicial elections, Part II of this paper summarizes the
problems that public financing is intended to address, while Part III
discusses public financing structures, their potential advantages, and
their difficulties.
II. PROBLEMS WITH PRIVATELY FINANCED
JuDIcIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGNS

Six problems are associated with the private financing of judicial election campaigns.
A. The Cost ofRunning JudicialElection Campaigns
Is IncreasingDramatically
"In the thirty-nine states that elect judges at some level," reported The Nation magazine in 1998, "the cost of judicial races is
rising at least as fast as that of either Congressional races or presidential campaigns, as candidates for the bench pay for sophisticated
ads, polls and consultants." 2 For example, the cost of running supreme court races in Alabama increased from $237,281 in 1986 to
$2,080,000 in 1996; in Ohio costs rose from $100,000 in 1980 to
over $2.7 million in 1986; and in Pennsylvania the cost went from
$523,000 in 1987 to $2.8 million in 1995. 3

2. Sheila Kaplan & Zoe Davidson, The Buying of the Bench, THE NATION,
Jan. 26, 1998, at 11. Information presented here on privately financed judicial
election campaigns has been drawn from articles published largely in the
popular press of the referenced states, and may for that reason be inaccurate.
3. See Mark Hansen, A Run for the Bench, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1998, at 68, 69-
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B. To Cover Their Costs, Judges Must Solicit Fundsfrom
ContributorsInterested in Case Outcomes
As the cost of campaigning escalates, judicial candidates are required to raise more money from contributors who typically include
lawyers, litigants, or organizations with an economic or political interest in the outcomes of cases to be decided by the courts where the
candidates are seeking election-or reelection. In Illinois, for example, one recent supreme court candidate was criticized for receiving
$80,000 in contributions from ten personal injury law firms, while
another was called to task for accepting $35,000 from a real estate
developer In Ohio, The PlainDealer reported that $2.1 million of
the $4.1 million in contributions received by supreme court justices
from 1993 to 1998 came from lawyers and lobbyists.5 And in Texas,
a reform group study reported that $3.7 million of $9.2 million contributed to supreme court justices between 1994 and 1997 were
"given by contributors
who were closely linked to parties on the
'6
court docket.
C. In Addition to Soliciting Contributions,Judges
Often Take Out Loans to Make Upfor Revenue
Shortfalls During Their Campaigns
Judges who are not independently wealthy and who go into debt
to underwrite their campaigns must later repay those debts with campaign contributions. The pressure on such judges to raise money is
thus compounded-they must seek out contributors to ensure not
only their reelection but their solvency as well.
D. When Judges Make Decisions That Favor Contributors,
They Are Accused of Favoritism
Given the high volume of contributions to judicial campaigns
from interested individuals and organizations, it is inevitable that
members of the press or public will call attention to what they regard
4. See Scott Fomek, High Court Candidates Spar Over Contributions,
Cm. SuN-TMES, Feb. 4,2000, at 18.
5. See T.C. Brown, Majority of Court Rulings Favor Campaign Donors,
THE PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Feb. 15, 2000, at 1A.

6. Janet Elliott, "60 Minutes" Visit Finds Court's Defenders in Hiding,
TEx. LAw., Aug. 24, 1998, at 1.
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as a suspicious correlation between a judge's campaign contributions
and the judge's subsequent, favorable treatment of the contributor.
In New York, for example, the "Association of the Bar of the City of
New York found an apparent correlation between campaign contributions to Surrogate Court judges and appointments as guardian ad
litem. ' '7 In Ohio, The Plain Dealer reported on the assertions of a
court reform group, that the "Ohio Supreme Court ruled favorably
two-thirds of the time for clients of the 20 Cleveland area attorneys
who gave the most to justices' political campaigns from 1993
through 1998. "8 In some cases, such as in Ohio, reported correlations may be questioned, and in other cases, true correlations may
have perfectly innocuous explanations. Even if the reality of influence can be rebutted, however, appearance problems remain.
E. Irrespectiveof Whether ContributorsDo in
FactInfluence JudicialDecisionMaking, the
Public Perceives That They Do

The public perception that judges are beholden to or influenced
by their contributors is pervasive. In Louisiana, for example, a Baton
Rouge survey found that 56% of voters thought that judicial decisions are influenced by campaign contributions, while only 33%
thought that "for the most part judges rule impartially." 9 In Pennsylvania, a 1998 poll sponsored by a special commission appointed by
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that nine out of ten voters
believed that judicial decisions were influenced by large campaign
contributions.10 In Texas, a 1998 survey sponsored by the state supreme court found that 83% of Texas adults, 69% of court personnel,
and 79% of Texas attorneys believed that campaign contributions influenced judicial decisions "very significantly" or "fairly

7. John Caher, Forum Explores JudicialElection Funding Reform, N.Y.
L.J., Dec. 8, 1999, at 1.

8. Brown, supra note 5.
9. Lanny Keller, JudicialCampaigns Undermine Respect, THE ADVOCATE
(Baton Rouge, La.), Jan. 13, 2000, at 9B.

10. See Dennis Chaptman, Process of Electing Judges Debated; Officials
From 17 States Study Campaign Finance, Threats to Independence,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Dec. 10, 2000, at 2B.
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significantly," while 48% of judges indicated that money had an impact on judicial decisions. 1
F. ProblemsAssociated With Private CampaignFund-Raising
May DiscourageExceptionally QualifiedJudicialCandidates
from Pursuingor Remaining in JudicialOffice
Many judges have expressed distaste for fund-raising and discomfort with receiving contributions from lawyers and interested organizations. Some have resigned to avoid private fund-raising that
they regard as threatening independence. Former Texas Supreme
Court Justice Bob Gammage, for example, reportedly quit after one
term because, in his view, the elections of judges in Texas had become too partisan and the politics of elections had influenced the
state's judges.12
II. PUBLIC FINANCING AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO PRIVATELY FUNDED
JUDIcIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGNS: ADVANTAGES, OPTIONS, AND
PROBLEMS

A. The PotentialAdvantages of PublicFinancing
For states that remain wedded to partisan or nonpartisan judicial
elections, the potential advantages of underwriting judicial campaigns with public funds are relatively clear. The more money
judges receive from public sources, the less they will have to raise
from private groups and individuals who are interested in the outcomes of cases the judges decide. Thus, public funding reduces the
potential for campaign contributions to influence judicial behavior
and addresses the public perception that such influence occurs.
Indeed, the case for public financing of judicial elections is arguably more compelling than for legislative or executive branch
races. Governors and legislators are, by design, the people's representatives. They are not expected to insulate themselves from the
electorate, but are supposed to be influenced by and to reflect their

11. See Lawrence N. Hansen, Editorial, Contribution Limits Protect Democracy, CmI. SuN-TIMES, Jan. 30, 2000, at 28.
12. See Ross Ramsey, Justice Gammage to Resign, Blasts Judge Election
Process, HOUSTON CHRON., Aug. 25, 1995, at A32.
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constituents' point of view. For this reason, political branch officeseekers publicize the decisions they intend to make so that voters
have a basis upon which to cast their ballots. The peril of financing
such races with private funds is not that it enables contributors to influence governmental decision making, but that it enables contributors to influence governmental decision making more than other constituents. Judicial candidates, in contrast, are not representatives.
They are supposed to be-and appear to be-impartial, to apply the
law as it is written regardless of whether it is popular with voters,
and are subject to discipline if they make campaign promises to decide particular cases in particular ways. Because virtually any external influence over a judge's independent decision making is inappropriate, the need to immunize judges from the influence-and the
appearance of influence--of campaign contributions may be all the
more pressing.
The six problems associated with privately funded judicial campaigns, that were summarized in the preceding section, have arisen
not only in states that select judges in partisan and nonpartisan elections, but also in "merit selection" states where appointed judges
have had to raise substantial sums in campaign contributions to fend
off opposition in their retention elections. 3 At the same time, however, merit selection states are different in ways that warrant separate
analysis.
First, the problems that public financing seeks to address will,
on average, be less acute in merit selection states. In such states,
election-related problems are eliminated from the initial selection
process because the judges are appointed (although judges are also
often initially appointed to fill vacancies in contested election states).
When judges later stand for reelection, they run against their records
rather than competing candidates. This assures that contentious, expensive elections will occur only when voters are dissatisfied with
the judge's performance, and not every time another candidate wants
the judge's job. Moreover, because voters cannot be sure that a more
satisfactory replacement will be appointed if they vote an incumbent

13. See Hansen, supra note 3, at 70 (stating "in many cases judges who are
appointed through merit selections are still subject to retention elections, with
the same high costs and the partisan nature of most elective campaigns.").
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out, significant opposition to a judge's retention is likely to arise only
when dissatisfaction levels are high.
Second, in retention elections, there are no "opponents" to finance. Publicly funding such elections in conventional ways would
thus involve one of three equally problematic alternatives: 1) to underwrite judges only, and be accused of "stacking the deck" in the
incumbents' favor; 2) to give an equal share of the public funds to
private opposition groups, for the purpose of subsidizing advertising
campaigns attacking the decisions of incumbent judges, who are
subject to ethics rules that will often forbid them from responding; or
3) to regulate the issues that opposition groups may address as a precondition to receipt of public funds, and be accused of attempting to
censor them.
This does not mean that public financing has no place in merit
selection states. The objections raised in the preceding paragraph
might be overcome to some extent, if funded opposition groups were
required to abide by the same rules as incumbents. Thus, in exchange for public funds, an opposition group might be required to
honor Code of Judicial Conduct restrictions on its campaign-related
speech. At a minimum, alternative forms of public funding-such as
subsidized voter guides or publicly disseminated judicial performance evaluations-might be appropriate.
B. PublicFundingOptions
1. Basic features of alternative public funding systems

4

There are several basic questions that any public financing system must address-questions that have generated a daunting array of
possible answers from states that have implemented or considered
implementing such systems. The variety of public financing programs is captured in an excerpt to a Connecticut Office of Legislative Research memorandum, attached as Appendix A to this paper.
The excerpt presents a graphic summary of public funding systems
implemented in different states.
14. For an excellent general discussion of public funding alternatives, see
ELIZABETH DANIEL, SUBSIDIZING POLrTICAL CAMPAIGNS: THE VARIETIES &

PUBLIC FINANCING (Brennan Center for Justice) (2000), available
at http://www.brennancenter.org/resourcesresourcescfseries.htnl.

VALUES OF
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Which races should be publicly funded? Almost all states that
have implemented public funding programs have confined their applicability to nonjudicial elections: gubernatorial races, other statewide races, or, less frequently, legislative races.15 Ifjudicial races are
included, should trial court races be publicly funded, or only supreme
court or court of appeals contests? Should public funding apply only
to general elections, or primary elections as well?
How much public funding should be provided? Public funds
may be used to partially or fully fund judicial and other races. In either case, the issue is how much public money to make available.
Because participation in public funding systems must ordinarily be
voluntary to satisfy First Amendment requirements, the success of
such programs depends on keeping funding levels high enough to
entice candidates to opt in.16
Which candidatesshould be eligible to receivepublicfunds? For
obvious reasons, the availability of public money should be limited
to serious candidates. There are a number of ways in which that can
be done. One is to limit eligible candidates to those who gather a
minimum number of petition signatures. Another is to require grant
applicants to generate a minimum number or amount of small campaign contributions. A third option is to limit grant eligibility to
candidates who received-or whose party received-a minimum
percentage of the vote in a previous election.
What conditions, if any, should be imposed on candidates who
receive publicfunds? Although states may not require candidates to
accept public funds, they may condition the distribution of public
funds to candidates who choose to receive them, on the candidates'
agreement to abide by specified conditions. Such conditions may include imposing limits on campaign contributions and spending, or
requiring candidates to participate in debates.
How can excessive spending by or on behalfofa publiclyfunded
candidate's opponent be addressed? Special problems arise when
publicly funded candidates bound by spending limits are opposed by
candidates who are not bound by spending limits because they do not
15. See infra app. A.
16. For a discussion of the First Amendment requirement of voluntary participation in public funding systems, see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 85-109
(1976).
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receive public funds, or who are supported by independent groups
that campaign for the candidate on their own. In such situations,
publicly funded candidates may be authorized to receive supplemental public funds or to exceed their private spending limits to ensure that they are not unfairly disadvantaged.
How should public funds be dispersed? The most obvious
means to distribute public funds is through simple block grants.
Other means, however, include awarding candidates grants that
match private contributions; reimbursing contributors with vouchers
or tax breaks; or delivering benefits in-kind, in the form of television
time or voters guides.
How should revenues needed to fund a public financing system
be generated? As discussed below, adequately funding public financing programs may be the single biggest problem such programs
confront. Possibilities include general tax revenues, tax checkoffswhich allow taxpayers to earmark a dollar amount of their tax liability to the campaign fund; tax add-ons-which allow taxpayers to add
to their tax liability with a contribution to the campaign fund; criminal fine or civil penalty surcharges; court fees; or attorney licensing
fees.
How and by whom should a public financingprogram be administered? Independent agencies are often responsible for administering state election laws, including public funding programs. In
the case of judicial elections, the issue is whether the judiciary's institutional independence might be undermined by locating the regulatory entity outside the judicial branch.
What are the FirstAmendment impediments to publiclyfunded
elections? In Buckley v. Valeo, 17 the United States Supreme Court
held mandatory spending limits unconstitutional, but in a footnote
observed that Congress could condition voluntary public funding on
candidates' willingness to abide by expenditure ceilings.' 8 Unanswered questions remain, however, concerning how coercive "voluntary" programs can be, and how extensively states may limit contributions to, and spending by, publicly funded candidates before
running afoul of the First Amendment. 19
17. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
18. See id. at 57 n.65.
19. See id. at 24-25.
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2. Public funding ofjudicial elections: the Wisconsin experience
a. a descriptionof the Wisconsin program
Although several states have ostensibly provided for publicly financed judicial elections, only Wisconsin has made a significant
move in that direction. 20 Under the Wisconsin system, a Wisconsin
Election Campaign Fund has been created with revenues generated
by a one dollar state tax return checkoff.2 ' Eight percent of the fund
is earmarked for grants to supreme court candidates in years when
there is a supreme court election. 22 The remainder of the fund underwrites campaigns for governor, lieutenant governor, attorney general, state treasurer, secretary
of state, superintendent of public in23
struction, and the legislature.
To be eligible to receive public funds, supreme court candidates
must be opposed, and must have raised contributions totaling slightly
less than $11,000-5% of the authorized disbursement limitation-in
increments of $100 or less.24 The maximum public grant available
for a supreme court candidate is $97,031, which represents 45% of a
$215,625 spending limit that, together with specified contribution
limits, candidates must agree to honor in exchange for accepting
public funds.2 5 In the event that a grant recipient is opposed by a
candidate who has not accepted public funds and has not agreed to
comply with spending and contribution limits voluntarily, the grant
recipient will be relieved of the duty to abide by spending and con26
tribution limits.

20. California permits supreme court candidates to make free statements in
the state ballot pamphlet. See CAL. ELEC. CODE § 13307 (2001). North Carolina, Texas, and Utah provide limited public funds to political parties that
could be, but have not been, used for judicial candidates. See Craig Byron
Holman, Remarks to the American Bar Association Commission on Public Financing of Judicial Campaigns 121 (Sept. 8, 2000). Montana has abandoned a
tax add-on funded program for supreme court candidates. See id.

21. See WIs. STAT. § 71.10(3)(a) (2000).
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

See id. § 11.50(3)(a)(2) (2000).
See id. § 11.50(4)(b) (2000).
See id. § 11.50(2)(a)(5) (2000).
See id. §§ 11.26(9)(b), 11.31 (2000).
See id. § 11.50(2)(i) (2000).
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The Wisconsin Election Campaign Fund is administered by the
Elections Board. The board is comprised of eight members variously
selected by the governor, the chief justice, the assembly speaker, the
senate majority leader, the minority leaders of both houses, and the
chairs of the two major political parties.
b.

the effectiveness of the Wisconsinprogram

Taxpayer participation in the Wisconsin checkoff system declined from close to 20% in 1979 to 8.7% in 1998-which reflected
a slight rebound from the all time low of 8.1% set in 1996.2' The resuiting fund has been inadequate to provide candidates with the
$97,031 grants authorized by the program. As a consequence, after
1989, when both supreme court candidates were fully funded, the
grants given to nine participating supreme court candidates have averaged only $45,354.28 As the size of the grants diminish, the incentive to opt into the system and abide by spending and contribution
limits in exchange for public funds is reduced. Not surprisingly,
then, the percentage of candidates opting into the Wisconsin public
funding program declined from a high of 55% in 1986 to just 14% in
2000.29 In 1999 the challenger for a supreme court seat declined to
accept public funds-the total sum available was S27,005-or voluntarily abide by spending limits, which authorized the incumbent to
30
receive that whole sum available and to exceed her spending limit.
Combined spending in the race exceeded $1.36 million. 3 1 The reaction of the press, public, and legal community to the sometimes
mean-spirited tenor of the 1999 campaign was negative, and in part
for that reason, the two candidates in the 2000 campaign agreed to

27. See More SupportingPubliclyFinancedElections in State, CAP. TIMES

(Madison), Aug. 14, 1999, at 2A.
28. See infra app. B, "Campaign Funding and Expenditures in Contested
Wisconsin Supreme Court Elections 1979-1997," which reflects Wisconsin's
declining election fund disbursements over time.
29. See Few Take State CampaignFunds,Attached Strings (Oct. 21, 2000),
at http:/wwv.jsonline.comlnewsfstatefotOO/camp221021 00a.asp.

30. See Richard P. Jones, Abrahamson Camp Urges Rival to Show Restraintin CampaignAds, MI.AVAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Feb. 27, 1999, at 2.
31. See Sarah Wyatt, Court Candidates OK Spending Cap; Sykes and But-

ler to Accept Public Campaign Money and Agree to a Spending Limit of
$215,625, Wis. ST. J., Feb. 23, 2000, at 3B.
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abide by the $215,625 spending limit in exchange for grants of
$13,500.32

Given the woeful state of the election campaign fund, proposals
have been made to increase the size of the checkoff, and to provide
better information to the public about the program funded by the
checkoff.33 Even if the election fund were sufficient to underwrite
the grants contemplated by the program, however, candidates would
still raise 55% of the dollars needed to fund their campaigns from
private contributions; 34 in cases where one candidate declines to accept public money, all limits are off. For that reason, the Wisconsin
Commission on Judicial Elections and Ethics issued a 1999 report
recommending that all supreme court and court of appeals races be
fully funded.35
C. PotentialProblems with PubliclyFundedJudicialElections

There are several hurdles that public financing systems must
overcome to be effective, as reflected in the Wisconsin experience.
First and foremost is the need for an adequate source of public funds.
The experience of virtually all states that have tried them demonstrates that tax add-ons are ineffective; experience in Wisconsin and36
other states suggests that tax checkoffs are likewise problematic.
Checkoff proponents, however, have pointed to Minnesota-where a
five dollar checkoff is supplemented with other public funds to generate seven times more money for legislative races than in Wisconsin, and where 99% of legislative candidates opt into the programto support the argument that tax checkoffs can be made to work.37
Further, without minimizing the political and philosophical issues it
32. See id.
33. See Richard P. Jones, Campaign Finance Bill Would Raise Checkoff,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Jan. 15, 1999, at 2.
34. See Wis. STAT. § 11.26(9)(a) (2000).
35. See Sarah Wyatt, Group: Public Should Finance Court Races Ethics
Commission Report Says that Would FosterPublic Trust in Bench, Wis. ST. J.,
Aug. 5, 1999, at 3B.
36. See infra app. C, "Tax Form Political Contribution 1990-1993," which
reflects somewhat dated but nonetheless revealing data on revenues generated
by add-ons and checkoffs in different states.
37. See Mike McCabe, Tax Checkoff Improves System, CAP. TIMES (Madison), Apr. 12, 2000, at 6A.
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raises, there would be a certain logic to funding judicial elections
from monies generated by court system users: lawyers, through increased licensing fees, and parties, through increased filing fees or
surcharges on criminal fines and civil penalties.
A second, closely related problem is that systems of partial public funding may be of dubious value. To the extent that judges must
continue to raise significant sums of money from lawyers and organizations with an interest in the outcomes of cases the judges will
be deciding, the appearance problem will persist. Contribution limits
may help to reduce that perception, as may new recusal standards recently adopted by the ABA. 3 " Full, or nearly full, public funding is
another possible solution, but one that places an even greater premium on the need for an adequate source of funds.
Third, how to account for the expenditures of independent organizations or political parties when imposing spending limits on
publicly funded candidates is an especially difficult problem to solve.
Authorizing publicly funded candidates to raise and spend more private money to counter independent expenditures on their opponents'
behalf undermines the purpose of the program. Resort to supplemental public funds is therefore preferable, but public funds are finite, and upper limits must be imposed on the supplemental grants
that compliant candidates may receive and spend to counteract the
effects of excessive spending by opponents who have elected not to
receive public funds, or who are the beneficiaries of independent expenditures. To the extent that the maximum supplemental public
38. In 1999, the ABA adopted Canon 3(E)(1)(e), which calls on a judge to
disqualify herself if the judge knows or learns that a party or a party's lawyer
has made aggregate contributions to a judge's campaign in excess of an
amount to be specified by the individual states. See ABA MODEL CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(E)(1)(e) (1999) (amending ABA MODEL CODE
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3 (1990)). In the new Canon 5(C)(3), judicial
candidates are told to "instruct his or her campaign committee(s)... not to accept campaign contributions for any election that exceed, in the aggregate," an
amount to be specified by the individual states. See ABA MODEL CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(C)(3) (1999) (amending ABA MODEL CODE OF
JuDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5 (1990)). The success of these new standards is
likely to turn in no small part on whether the public's perception of the maximum contribution a judicial candidate can receive without compromising her
impartiality coincides with the state supreme courts' perception when they establish maximum allowable contributions.
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grants given compliant candidates are unable to keep pgace with the
private spending of opposing candidates-or the parties or independent organizations that support them-the imbalance will persist.
Moreover, all of this assumes that independent organizations are
campaigning on "behalf' of their candidate in good faith, which may
not always be the case. If an organization attempts to undermine a
candidate by running consciously ham-handed commercials on the
candidate's behalf, such an act of sabotage should not entitle the opposing candidate-the candidate secretly favored by the organization
responsible for the commercials-to receive additional funds to
counter the sham ads. Election commissions must prepare to undertake the complicated task of verifying the authenticity of independent
expenditures that trigger the disbursement of supplemental funds.
A fourth problem concerns the impact of public financing on
competition. To the extent that the availability of public money
makes running for elective office more attractive, publicly financed
judicial elections will tend to increase competition for judicial office.
On the one hand, increased competition is salutary in that it expands
voter choice. On the other hand, increased competition may undermine ongoing efforts to cool judicial campaign rhetoric and dissuade
candidates and the electorate from compromising judicial independence by turning elections into referenda on the popularity of incumbent judges' isolated decisions.
IV. CONCLUSION

At a luncheon meeting of the ABA Commission on Separation
of Powers and Judicial Independence that I attended in 1996, Judge
Abner Mikva observed in passing that "just throwing money at a
problem is highly underrated." His point rings especially true in the
context of publicly financed judicial elections. With sufficient resources, states could fully fund judicial elections at levels that no rational candidate would decline. Independent expenditures on behalf
of any given candidate could be countered by offering additional
public money to that candidate's opponent, thereby minimizing the
impact of private money on election outcomes. Public financing
proposals raise a variety of issues alluded to in this paper, but the
most critical among them is whether the political will can be found to
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commit the public funds necessary to make public financing systems
solvent and workable.
The Wisconsin program-the only state program to subsidize
judicial elections-is now on the brink of financial failure, which has
fueled skeptics' suspicion that public financing is infeasible. Such a
conclusion may, however, be premature. First, campaign finance reform has become a high profile issue in presidential politics, indicating a general need for finance reform. Second, significant public
financing programs have recently been adopted in Arizona, Maine,
Massachusetts, and Vermont, 39 which indicates that the political will
to create such programs exists. Third, the constitutionality of the
Maine program was recently upheld by the First Circuit, which
may encourage other states to implement similar programs. Fourth,
judicial elections have received an unprecedented volume of negative
national press in recent years, which may energize reform efforts and
lead more states to consider including judicial races within the ambit
of their public financing initiatives. For states that are unwilling to
jettison elections in favor of an appointive method of judicial selection, public financing should remain on the table as an alternative
means to control some of the adverse effects of private fund-raising
on judicial elections.

39. See Janieki, supranote 1.
40. See Daggett v. Comm'n on Govt'l Ethics & Election Practices, 205
F.3d 445 (lst Cir. 2000).
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APPENDIX A
41
SUMMARY OF PUBLIC FINANCING PROVISIONS

STATE

YEAR
LEGISLATION
PASSED

FUNDING
SOURCE

RECIPIENTS

AL

1983

Tax add-on

Political

Tax add-on

Political
Parties
parties

1988
AR

OFFICES
ELECTIONS
COVERED

parties

Tax checkoff,

Statewide

Primary

1998 Initiative lobbyists' fees, Candidates and legislaand
fines, and penalan eislaa
ties
tive
general

1985
(Program
expired)

Political contribution taxes and
candidate filing Candidates
fees

Governor
Can
Cabinet

Primary
a
general

Governor
and
Cabinet

Primary
and
general

FL
1998
Appropriation,
Constitutional voluntary fees,
Amendment other moneys

Candidates

HA

1978

Tax checkoff,
appropriation,
other moneys

ID

1975

Tax checkoff

Political

IN

1976

Vanity license
plate fees

Political
parties

41. See Janicki, supra note 1, at tbl. 1.

All nonfed- Primary
Candidates eral elective
and
offices
general

parties
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STATE

YEAR
LEGISLATION
PASSED

IA

1973

FUNDING
SOURCE

RECIPIENTS

OFFICES

COVERED

ELECTIONS

Tax checkoff

Political

1976

Tax checkoff

Political
Partieal
parties

1992

Appropriation,
cndidate filin
Governor/
Primary and
fees, commit- Candidates lieutenant
tee surplus
governor slates
general
funds

KY

1973

ME
1996
Initiative

Tax add-on

parties

Political
parties

Appropriation,
qualifying
contributions, Candidates Governor and
tax checkoff,
legislative
donations, and

Primary and
general

fines

MD

1974
1975

MA

MI

MN

GoverCandidates nor/lieutenant
governor
Tax checkoff Candidates Statewide
Tax add-on

Appropriation,
1998

tax checkoff,

Initiative

election fines,
and penalties

Primary and
Primary and
-general

Statewide,
legislative, and Primary and

Governor's
Council

general

Governor

Primary and
general

1976

Tax checkoff Candidates

1974

Appropriation,
income
proer or
Statewide and
property tax Candidates legislative;
checkoff, ex- and politi- state party
cess anony- cal parties committees
mous contributions

Primary and
general
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YEAR
LEGISLATION
PASSED

NE

1992

FUNDING
SOURCE

RECIPIENTS

1998: Legislative 2000:
Adds Boards
Appropriation,
of Regents and
tax checkoff, Candidates Education, and
penalties, and
Public Service
fees

1974

Appropriation,
taxNJh19Candidates

NM

1992

Tax add-on

1975

Tax checkoff

1988

Tax checkoff Candidates

OH

1987

Tax checkoff

RIpate

1973
1988

Tax checkoff

NC

1973

VT

1997

VA

1982

WI

1977

Primary and
general

Governor

General

Political
parties
Political

Partieal
parties

Political
parties
Political

Partieal

General

Political
parties

Appropriation,tax
checkoff,
lobbyists' as- Candidates
sessment, and
corporation
filing fees
Political
Parties
Tax add-on
parties
Tax
checkoff

General

Governor

Appropriation
General office
tax checkoff Candidates (statewide)
Tax checkoff

ELECTIONS

Commission
2002: Adds all
other statewide
officials

NJ

UT

OFFICES
COVERED

[Vol. 34:1467

Candida

Governor,
lieutenant
governor

Primary and
general

Statewide and
legislative

General
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APPENDIX B
CAMPAIGN AND EXPENDITURES IN CONTESTED
WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT ELECTIONS 1979-1997

NUMBER OF
CANDIDATES

1979
1980
1983
1989
1990
1994
1995
1996
1997
1999

2
4
2
2
2
3
5
7
2
2
(only 1 par-

TOTAL
RECEIPTS OF

WECF42 GRANT
MONEY RECEIVED

ALL

BY ALL

CANDIDATES

CANDIDATES

$101,708
$194,393
$269,050
$362,114
$389,564
$284,581
$709,041
$824,228
$899,074
$,

S39,953
$65,624
$58,188
$194,062
$76,038
$67,536
$30,953
$26,398
$26,148

$102,564
S200,691
$283,113
$428,496
$386,398
$289,725
S907,953
S825,453
$898,310

$27,005

$1,325,000

$30,000

$4 ,000

ticipating)
2000

2

TOTAL
EXPENDITURES
OF ALL
CANDIDATES

42. Data from Wisconsin Election Campaign Fund, supplied by Roy A.
Schotland.
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APPENDIX C
TAx FORM POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS 1990-199343
1990

% of

%of

%of

%of

Add On
Amount Returns Amount Returns Amount Returns Amount Returns
States
Alabama
$13,597
1 $11,602
*
$10,020
*
NA
*
19,897
*
$18,898
*
Arizona
16,195
*
16,508
*
127,188
*
169,358
*
157,970
California
188,238
1,410
*
1,04
*
Louisiana
**
**
1
19,152
1
17,681
1
19,927
1
17,603
Maine0
Massachu2
setts
69,44d
2
60,995
2
59,258
2
56,648
New
**
1,542
*
1,370
Mexico
**
North
*
*
20,699
*
21,811
Carolina*
26,633
*
23,287
34,818
I
14,842
*
Virginia
37,632
1
35,110
1
370,893
334,541
325,541
1 259,4021
Check Off
States
40 $386,418
34 $375,965
35
Hawaii*
$419,338
38 $456,952
10
38,698
9
36,888
8
35,848
8
Idaho
44,111
7
153,234
8
Iowa +
224,973
9 179,124
7 167,918
7
281,948
7 264,024
6 215,104
7
201,022
Kentucky
12
Michigan0 1,534,600
19 1,483,800
18 1,306,000
16 1,474,000
Minne12
13 1,544,19
1
sota'
1,878,310
15 1,683,405
13 1,638,530
New
29
34 1,191,48
33 1,112,06
31 1,024,911
Jersey*
1,263,831
14
North
13
423,991
Carolina
505,935
17 424,239
15 398,350
21 1,090,456
21
987,161
19
946,429
19
Ohio
1,064,105
Rhode
8 202,468
6
201,057
6
Island +
376,595
9 265,270
69,646
9
Utah
80,389
12
94,135
14
69,656
1
Wiscon14
1
1
407,179
16 378,824
15
359,66
sin*
431,478
17,578,769
6,899,383
6,809,9551
. 8,105,613
*Less than 0.5% of returns
** Fund not in effect for that year
0 In these states, the money goes into an election fund that is then allocated to candidates.

43. Data supplied by Ruth S. Jones, Arizona State University School of

Law.

June 2001]

PUBLICLY FiNANCED ELECTIONS

1487

+ In these states, tax payers have options to give to political parties or to a general election
fund.
Note: percentages for Hawaii represent taxpayers, not returns.
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